Energy Policy: A Norwegian Perspective by Tonne, Tore




Energy Policy: A Norwegian Perspective
Tore Tonne
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb
Part of the Energy Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.
Recommended Citation
Tore Tonne, Energy Policy: A Norwegian Perspective, 5 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 722 (1983-1984)
Energy Policy: A Norwegian Perspective
Tore Tonne *
I. INTRODUCTION
Few countries in the industrialized West are more energy directed
than Norway.' Whereas most nations have paid particular attention to
the relationship between their economic growth and the consumption of
energy, Norway has to a high degree based her industrialization and eco-
nomic growth on the exploitation of indigeneous energy resources.
Therefore, establishing principles of developing and using energy re-
sources has been an important political topic in Norway since industriali-
zation gathered headway near the turn of the century.
There are two distinct phases in Norwegian energy history-first,
the development of hydropower potential beginning on the eve of the
nineteenth century, and second, the development of oil and gas resources
on the Norwegian continental shelf which started only 15 years ago. Dif-
ferent as the phases are, they are nevertheless importantly similar in their
approaches and solutions to various legal and economic problems in the
energy field. Although it is the policy concerning exploitation of the oil
and gas fields off the Norwegian coast that has drawn international atten-
tion lately, it is useful to look at this policy in retrospect by first consider-
ing the principles laid down for the development of Norwegian
hydropower potential. This article, therefore, sets out to describe the
legal and political principles, as well as the perspectives, of Norwegian
policy of using indigeneous energy resources-first in the hydro and then
in the petroleum sector. A main conclusion will be that in both these
sectors Norway has managed to establish a legal framework which
secures the full national control and which leads to a rational
• Deputy Director General of the Royal Ministry of Petroleum and Energy of Norway.
l See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF IEA
COUNTRIES 1982 REVIEW (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1982 REVIEW]. Table below was compiled
by the author from this source:
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utilization of the resources to the benefit of the whole society, without at
the same time reducing the importance of foreign capital and technology
or ignoring international cooperation.
II. TAPPING NORWAY'S HYDROPOWER
A. History and Background: The Panic and Concession Acts
Norway is the northernmost nation of the world, stretching from
the 58th parallel (like Kodiak) to north of the 70th parallel (like Prudhoe
Bay), which means that nearly half of the country is north of the arctic
circle. The land area is 125,000 square miles, which is a little less than
Montana, but bigger than for instance Italy, Great Britain or Germany.
The country is mountainous, and with a coastline of 1,700 miles toward
the North Atlantic ocean, the yearly precipitation is high, much of it
falling as snow in the winter months. The total energy potential of water
flowing on Norway's surface is estimated at 550 terawatthours (TWh)
2per year. Of this amount, 172 TWh are reckoned to be economically
exploitable under today's economic conditions.' Despite modest technol-
ogy and small-scale power plants, much of that potential has for a long
time been relatively easy to utilize. Toward the end of the eighteenth
century, however, increased possibilities for the use of electricity in
households and industry caused increased interest in developing Norwe-
gian hydro resources to generate electricity. Soon investors of foreign
capital looked to invest in Norway's electricity production alone or, more
commonly, in combinations that included power intensive industries like
fertilizers and aluminum.
The rapid increase of foreign interest in Norwegian hydro resources
triggered one of Norway's most complex and important political strug-
gles. According to Norwegian law, rivers, waterfalls and lakes may be
privately owned. As a result, it soon became clear that foreign capital
could gain control of substantial natural resources.' This led to the pas-
sage of legislation in 1906 that required anyone, Norwegian or foreign, to
obtain a "concession" from the public authorities before acquiring a wa-
terfall.' This Act, which is sometimes referred to as the "panic act" be-
cause of the political circumstances when it was passed,6 was only
2 1 TWh = 1 billion kilowatthour (109 kWh). The energy content of 1 TWh per year is similar
to the energy content of approximately 84.000 tons of oil per year or 1.740 barrels of oil per day.
3 NORWEGIAN WATER RESOURCES AND ELECTRICITY BOARD (NWE), APPENDIX TO RE-
PORT No. 54 TO THE STORTING REGARDING THE FUTURE USE AND PRODUCTION OF ENERGY IN
NORWAY (1979-80). [Hereinafter cited as REPORT No. 54].
4 Act of Mar. 15, 1940, No. 3. At that time, Act of July 1, 1887, No. 4.
5 Act of June 12, 1906, No. 12.
6 Act of June 12, 1906 was introduced in a proposition of Apr. 7, 1906, which, in some respects,
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temporary, however. Years of legal debates and political struggles re-
sulted in passage of new legislation in 1917-the so-called Concession
Act.7 This Act, with only minor amendments, and the Water Regula-
tions Act8 passed in the same year have together regulated the develop-
ment of hydropower in Norway ever since.
While the immediate objective of the Panic Act had been to avoid
foreign takeover of Norwegian waterfalls, the objectives of the Conces-
sion Act were broader. It sought to secure public control and the best
possible economic utilization of national resources. The Act now pro-
vides that no one, except the state, may acquire usufruct or proprietary
title of waterfalls of capacities exceeding 1000 natural horse-powers with-
out the King's permission, a "concession." 9 The King may grant such a
concession to either Norwegian or foreign persons or companies only in
accordance with basic rules written into the Act itself and detailed condi-
tions established by the state in each individual case.' In addition, Par-
liament must approve nearly all grants of concession."' One of the most
important provisions of the Concession Act was a general rule limiting
the duration of concessions to private persons or companies. After years
of political struggle, it was established that concessions could be granted
only for periods not exceeding sixty years. The waterfalls and all power
production installations-dams, channels, tunnels, power stations and all
their belongings and machinery-were to accrue to the state free of
charge at the end of the granted concession. 2 This rule, the hjemfall,
which was proposed during the political turmoil following passage of the
Panic Act,' 3 was unique in both the Norwegian and international con-
texts. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality when
it was challenged in 1918.14 There has been no further legal dispute
about it.
was more restrictive than the act finally adopted by the Storting. The political situation was rather
hectic. Norway had just gained its independence from Sweden. It was quite clear that strong foreign
capital interests were exploring the country for waterfalls available for sale. Also, foreigners were
trying to convince private owners to sell. Often, these owners were unaware of the potential worth
of their properties. To prevent a rapid foreign takeover of what most people considered national
resources, a law had to be written and introduced within a few days. Some people said that the
temporary act was written in panic-therefore, the "Panic Act".
7 Act of Dec. 14, 1917, No. 16, Relating to Acquisitions of Waterfalls, Mines and other Real
Properties, etc.
8 Act of Dec. 14, 1917, No. 17.
9 Id. § 1.
0IId. §2.
11 Id.
12 Id. § 17.
13 Act of Mar. 23, 1901.
14 Supreme Court decision, effective Mar. 12, 1918. (Norsk Rettstidende 1918).
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Some of the powerplants built after the passing of the Concession
Act have already accrued to the state, and several others will accrue in
the 1980s and 1990s. In many cases, companies that built and operated
power stations during a concession period have entered into long-term
lease agreements with the state in order to continue operations after the
expiration of the concession. Most of those companies have arranged to
continue utilizing some of the power for their production of goods, but
on revised terms decided by Parliament.
B. Evaluation of the Results of the Concession Policies
Any evaluation of this legislation should take into consideration the
fact that Norway developed her hydropower primarily to serve industry.
Although private household electrification also was a national goal, it
was the goal of industrialization and the possibility of utilizing the vast
hydro potential to achieve it that compelled development of a special
legal framework.
Both the desire to industrialize and the interest in developing water
resources to facilitate it had broad support. But because the resources
were national and inexhaustible, the state wished to maintain control of
them. Nevertheless, the state clearly did not have the capital needed for
hydro power development. It was obviously necessary to invite foreign
capital and technology. In this context the "hjemfall" rule served as a
practical political compromise. While it vested full control of Norway's
hydro-resource development in the state, it did not impose full responsi-
bility for hydroelectric investment and production in the state as well. In
the years that followed, private industry and local public utilities carried
out most of the hydroelectric expansion.
Moreover, it is impossible to calculate what effect the new legisla-
tion may have had on the expansion of the hydropower sector. Because
there was at the time no real politically realistic alternative, the question
is but a theoretical one. It is possible that the Concession Act may have
temporarily restrained private industry's willingness to invest in the hy-
dropower sector-at least as compared with the propensity to invest
prior to the "hjemfall" rule. Nevertheless, there was substantial indus-
trial expansion during the first quarter of this century. Although some
was based on hydropower acquired and developed prior to the Act, some
stemmed from many projects realized under the new legislation.
Considering the limited availability of development resources like
technology and labor capacity, actual expansion of generating capacity
did not fall short of what could have been expected under the previous
legislation. Whereas the production of hydroelectricity in Norway in
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1920 was 1.2 TWh, t5 by the time of the Second World War it had in-
creased to 10.9 TWh. 6 In addition, by 1925 Norway had obtained a
twelve percent share of the world production of aluminum, and had be-
gun substantial production of fertilizers, ferro alloys and magnesium.1 7
Even if Norway later lost some of its share of the world market for alu-
minum, the decrease did not result from any scarcity of electricity. Nor-
way's role as a producer of energy-intensive products was never
questioned.
Moreover, during the long reconstruction and growth period after
the Second World War broad political support for developing hydro-
power for further industrial expansion remained stable. As a result, from
approximately ten TWh in 1945, production of hydroelectricity increased
to sixteen TWh in 1950, to thirty TWh in 1960, to fifty-six TWh in 1970,
and approximately ninety TWh in 1980.18
C. Recent Development in Norwegian Hydroelectric Production
During the post-war period the size and complexity of hydropower
projects increased immensely. This period also saw increases in the
state's role as a direct investor in production and transmission. Whereas
in 1957 private companies produced 36.5% of the electricity, local public
utilities produced 39% and the state produced 24.5%,19 twenty years
later the proportions have changed to 14%, 49.5% and 36.5% respec-
tively.2" This direct state involvement is handled by the State Power Sys-
tem, a directorate under the Norwegian Water Resources and Electricity
Board.21 The State Power system plays an important role in supplying
electricity on equal economic terms to local utilities and distributors all
over the country, thus contributing to security of supplies and harmoni-
zation of electricity prices. Second, it also plays a significant role in in-
dustrial concerns. Because the state was striving to promote the further
expansion of power intensive industries, the State Power System worked
15 See REPORT No. 54, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16 Id. In the meantime, the depression had made many investments unprofitable and led to the
financial collapse of many utilities.
17 Internal statistics of the Association of Norwegian Electrochemical and Metallurgical Indus-
tries. (not published).
18 CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NORWAY, 1982 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 149, 152
[hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL YEARBOOK]. The latter figure corresponds to approximately 13.5
mtoe, or 270,000 bd. which is more than half of the total yearly energy requirements of Norway.
19 REPORT No. 54, supra note 3, at 33.
20 Id.
21 The Norwegian Water Resources and Electricity Board (NVE) was first organized under the
Ministry of Industry and later under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy when that Ministry was
established in 1978. Royal Decree of Jan. 11, 1978.
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to develop the capacity and to supply power intensive industries with
electricity on special long-term contracts. Large investments in produc-
ing aluminum, magnesium, iron and steel, ferro alloys and chemicals
could be made only with the long-term contract assurances of electricity
supply and price.22
It should be noted, however, that the relatively cheap power was not
the sole factor behind expansion of these industries. As already men-
tioned, there was also the import of capital and technology. And, there
was a third factor-the market. With a population of only 3.1 million in
1945, the domestic market was insignificant for industries of this size.
2 3
Consequently, the industry had to aim close to one hundred percent of its
production at export markets. Active efforts to liberalize trade therefore
became another cornerstone of Norwegian post-War industrial policy.
This attitude and need is reflected in Norway's accession to the GATT
and participation in all the GATT negotiating rounds; membership in
OEEC/OECD; the Bretton Woods institutions, EFTA; and the estab-
lishment of free trade agreements with the European Communities.
With exports of more than forty percent of gross national product and
eighty to ninety percent going to the OECD countries, Norway's indus-
try and economy have become closely linked and exposed to interna-
tional trade.2 4
In addition to the expansion of an export industry of power inten-
sive production, the extensive development of the hydropower industry
caused an important side effect-Norway developed a domestic market
for nearly everything required to build and operate a comprehensive hy-
droelectric system. From the outset the state clearly expressed its inter-
22 [Editors' note: the following chart was compiled by the author from information supplied in
THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF NORWAY, INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS, an annual publica-
tion which was not available for reference:]
Gross Investments (Mill. NOK)
1950 1955 1960 1965
Iron, steel, ferro alloys 55 87 102 142
Non ferrous metals 42 92 111 272
Aluminium 21 49 83 212
Chemicals 108 149 137 283
23 See supra note 17.
Aluminium Ferroalloys
Norwegian consumption (approx.) 1982 40,000 tons 4,000 tons
Norwegian production capacity 1982 770,000 tons 800,000 tons
24 See supra note 22.
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est in fostering domestic Norwegian capacity to supply to industry on a
non-discriminatory basis with its needs. Thus, Norwegian production of
equipment for power stations and transmission systems, as well as engi-
neering and construction works, expanded rapidly and further increased
the energy orientation of the Norwegian economy. Over the years, the
Norwegian industry has developed the competence and capacity to con-
struct and manage most elements of an integrated hydroelectricity and
power intensive industrial system-for not only Norwegian needs, but
also for export.
D. The Future of Norwegian Hydropower
Today, the total economic hydropower potential in Norway is esti-
mated at 172 TWh.25 Of this, approximately ninety-seven TWh, or fifty-
six percent, has already been developed.26 This capacity places Norway
on top among industrial nations for per capita electricity production.27
While in 1981 per capita electricity production in Norway amounted to
22,600 kWh, the corresponding figure in the United States was 10,800
kWh and in Canada was 16,500 kWh.28 Hydropower accounted for vir-
tually one hundred percent of electricity generated in Norway as com-
pared with a mere eleven percent in the United States. 29
Development of hydropower resources will continue in the years
ahead. But while political agreement characterized development of
water resources in the 1950s and 1960s, controversy over the environ-
mental consequences of development has arisen in connection with sev-
eral recent projects. Environmental concerns have caused the banning of
twelve of the remaining seventy-five TWh of hydropower potential avail-
able from waterfalls.30 Some twelve to thirteen TWh have also been tem-
porarily banned pending evaluation of environmental impact. 3'
1960 1970 1980
Norwegian GNP 36 bill NOK 80 bill NOK 285 bill NOK
Total exports of goods
services 14 bill NOK 33 bill NOK 135 bill NOK
Total exports/GNP 39% 41% 47%
Exports to OECD/
Total exports 81% 88% 90%
25 See REPORT No. 54, supra note 3, at 42.
26 Id.
27 See generally INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 1.
28 Id. Total energy consumption in Norway amounted to 5.9 toeper capita in 1981, which was
above the OECD average but below the United States consumption of 7.7 toeper capita. Id.
29 Id.
30 Proposition No. 4 (1972-73), Apr. 6, 1973.
31 Proposition No. 77 (9179-80), Oct. 20, 1980.
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Nevertheless, the remaining potential should suffice in this century to
avoid the need to build alternative generating capacity, be it coal-fired or
nuclear.
The State Power System will play a dominant role in developing the
remaining potential, which will involve the development of projects that
are technically complex, financially demanding and politically controver-
sial. Investments could amount to some three to four billion Norwegian
1984-Kroner12 per year for the next ten years. Although some of these
investments may be financed by loans from abroad, such foreign loans
will probably play a lesser role than previously. The state budget will
cover the State Power System's financial needs while most of the public
utilities will finance their investments through the domestic credit
market.
II. NORWAY'S HYDROCARBONS AND PETROLEUM
A. The Beginnings of Hydrocarbon Development and Gradual
Government Involvement
As a result of the discovery in 1959 of a giant gas field in Groningen,
Holland, international oil company interest in the North Sea sedimentary
basin increased dramatically. Previously, the possibility of Norwegian
oil and gas production had hardly been considered; even in 1959, few
considered it more than wishful thinking. Nevertheless, oil company in-
terest in exploration activities continued to grow. That interest called for
new Norwegian legislation.
On May 31, 1963, Norway proclaimed sovereignty over the seabed
and its subsoil outside the Norwegian coast by Royal Decree.33 The De-
cree defined the area of sovereignty in respect of the exploration for an
exploitation of natural deposits to such extent as the depth of the sea
permits the utilization of natural deposits, irrespective of any other terri-
torial limits at sea, but not beyond the median line in relation to other
states. 34 Compared to the turmoil spurred by introduction of the Con-
cession Act covering waterfalls, the establishment of basic legislation on
the continental shelf did not create much internal political debate or raise
questions of constitutionality. On the other hand, the new Norwegian
continental shelf legislation involved questions not posed by the Conces-
sion Act-questions of international law.
32 One United States dollar is approximately equivalent to 7.50 Norwegian Kroner.
33 Royal Decree of May 31, 1963, Relating to the Sovereignty of Norway over the Seabed and
Subsoil outside the Norwegian Coast.
34 Id.
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The Geneva Convention of 1958 gave coastal states the right to ex-
tend their jurisdiction to the continental shelf, as defined by the Conven-
tion, for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural resources.35
The basis for such jurisdiction had been laid in 1945, when the United
States proclaimed exclusive right to the natural resources on the seabed
and in the subsoil of the American continental shelf.3 6 Because several
countries followed the United States example by making similar claims,
the Geneva Convention can be regarded more or less as a codification of
international law.
It was not quite clear, however, what influence the Convention
might have on the future delimitation of continental shelves. As a result,
Norway and several other countries did not immediately sign or ratify
the Geneva Convention. But in the years following the 1963 proclama-
tion of sovereignty, the delimitation of the southern part of the Norwe-
gian continental shelf was accomplished through bilateral treaties with
the United Kingdom,37 Denmark38 and Sweden.39 Then in 1971, Norway
finally became a party to the Geneva Convention.40 In 1981, the
Norwegians reached an agreement with Iceland on the continental shelf
between Iceland and the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen.4 However,
the delimitation between Jan Mayen and Greenland and boundary line
on the continental shelf bordering with the Soviet Union still remain
unsettled.
Shortly after the Royal Decree proclaiming sovereignty, in June,
1963, the legislature passed a special act, the Submarine Resources Act,
addressing exploration and exploitation of submarine natural resources. 42
The Submarine Resources Act of 1963 applies to the part of the conti-
nental shelf which under the decree of 1963 became subject to Norwe-
gian sovereignty. In 1979 the Submarine Resources Act was amended to
apply to such activities also outside the Norwegian part of the continen-
35 Geneva Convention of the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578,
499 U.N.T.S. 311.
36 The Truman Proclamation of the Continental Shelf, Sept. 28, 1945, Proclamation No. 2668, 3
C.F.R. § 68 (1943-48 Cum. Supp.), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
37 Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1965, U.K.-
Norway.
38 Agreement of Dec. 8, 1965, Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between
Norway and Denmark.
39 Agreement of July 24, 1968, between Norway and Sweden Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between the two countries.
40 Proposition No. 112 (1970-71) to the Storting, formal ratification Sept. 9, 1971 (came into
force Oct. 9 1971).
41 Agreement of Oct. 22, 1981, between Norway and Iceland Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen.
42 Act of Mar. 25, 1977, No. 21.
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tal shelf ". . . .if such application follows from specific agreement with a
foreign state or from international law."' a3 This typical "authority act"
had three general effects:
(1) It established the state's sole right to subsea natural resources;44
(2) it authorized the King to give the right to explore and exploit these
resources to Norwegian or foreign persons-including institutions,
companies, and other association; and4
5
(3) it authorized the King to stipulate specific conditions for such permis-
sion and to issue detailed regulations relating to the exploration for
and exploitation of subsea natural resources.
This formed the necessary legal basis for the state both to permit and to
regulate activities on the Norwegian continental shelf.
B. Government Granted Licenses
The resulting regulations constitute an extensive legal framework
for offshore activities. That framework covers areas such as the granting
of licenses, working environments and safety, and taxation. Although
description of these laws and regulations lies beyond the scope of this
perspective, brief mention should be made of the rules covering the
granting of licenses.
The current rules relating to licenses are prescribed by the Royal
Decree of December 8, 1972. 4' According to the provisions of the De-
cree and subject to any additional conditions specified in a license itself,
three general types of licenses may be granted: (1) exploration licenses;
(2) production licenses; and (3) licenses for storage installations, liquifica-
tion installations, installations for production of electricity, pipelines,
shipment installations and electrical cables.4a
1. Exploration Licenses
An exploration license may be granted to Norwegian or foreign
companies, institutions or other associations for a three year period.4 9




46 Id. § 3.
47 Royal Decree of Dec. 8, 1972, Relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum in
the Seabed and Substrata of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. A comprehensive revision of the
present legislation has led to a bill expected to pass Norway's parliament, the Storting, early in 1985.
The bill, which is mainly a codification of existing principles is expected to enter into force some
months later.
48 Act of June 21, 1963, No. 12, Relating to Exploration for and Exploitation of Submarine
Natural Resources, § 3.
4 9 Id. §§4,6.
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The license entitles the holder to perform general geological and geo-
physical exploration. ° It does not, however, authorize drilling." Nor
does it confer sole rights for exploration or preferential status for future
exploitation of potential petroleum discoveries.5 2 In fact, licensees must
forward all exploration results, such as field data and interpretations, to
the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy free of charge and on a confiden-
tial basis. 3
2. Production Licenses
A production license may be granted to companies, institutions or
other associations established in accordance with Norwegian legislation
and situated in Norway. In special circumstances, foreign companies
may receive production licenses-but only if they (1) have a branch in
Norway, (2) have permanent facilities, and (3) have representatives who
are authorized to enter into binding commitments to the same extent as
the board members of a Norwegian joint-stock company.54 A produc-
tion license gives the licensee an exclusive right both to explore and to
exploit petroleum deposits in a specific area.
There are several basic conditions and limitations for receipt and use
of production licenses. First, to obtain a production license, an applicant
must undertake to carry out a work program in the licensed area during
the first six years. 6 That program must include, inter alia, plans to drill
a certain number of wells down to a certain depth.57 Secondly, the appli-
cant must pay special fees for the application and for the granting of a
license. 8 And thirdly, as soon as production starts, the licensee must
begin to pay a royalty on the value of petroleum produced. 9
3. Installation Licenses
Each time the Ministry grants installation licenses, e.g. for con-
structing pipelines or storage facilities, on the continental shelf, it stipu-
lates terms for the individual case.
50 Id. §7.
51 Id.
52 Id. § 8.
53 Id. § 10.
5 4 Id. §11.
55 Id. § 15. This production license is valid for six years. Id.
56 Id. §§ 15, 20, 22. Section 20 provides that this license will be extended for 30 years under
§ 15 after the expiration of six years. Id.
57 Id. § 17.
58 Id. §§ 12, 18, 25.
59 Id. § 26.
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C. The Fields
1. Announcing and Allocating Blocks
Like legislation in the hydropower sector, legislation in the petro-
leum sector gives the state complete control of resource development
without necessarily making the state a main investor or producer. When
the first announcement of blocks on the Norwegian continental shelf was
made in 1965, there were no Norwegian oil companies. It was quite ob-
vious that during the first years foreign oil companies would have to
carry out offshore activities with foreign technology and capital. But it
was equally clear that the state should thoroughly control such activities
in order to bring Norwegian industry into all aspects of the petroleum
activity as soon as possible. Many often wonder whether this and other
aspects of Norwegian petroleum policy have delayed the development of
Norwegian petroleum resources. The best response is probably a brief
overview of developments thus far.
The government first announced the availability of 278 blocks of
approximately 200 square miles each on the Norwegian continental shelf
in 1965.60 In response, the government received eleven applications cov-
ering 208 of the blocks. At the conclusion of negotiations with each indi-
vidual applicant, the state allocated seventy blocks.
The first drilling on the Norwegian continental shelf took place the
following year. Only two years later, the first discovery was made at the
Cod field. On Christmas Eve of 1969 the Phillips Petroleum Company
discovered the Ekofisk field. Oil production began in 1971.
Six concession rounds have followed that first announcement of
blocks in 1965. The first announcements were concentrated in the area
south of the sixty-second parallel and adjacent to the British sector. The
fifth round of June 1979, however, announced twenty-six blocks north of
sixty-two degrees latitude. This resulted in the first licenses and the first
exploratory drilling off the coast of northern Norway. That area's first
petroleum finds were made in 1981.
2. Ekofisk Field
As mentioned above, the first production of oil on the Norwegian
continental shelf took place at the Phillips-operated Ekofisk field in 1971,
some six years after the first announcements of blocks and eighteen
months after the field's discovery. The Ekofisk field, together with other
smaller adjacent fields in the so-called Ekofisk area, had recoverable
60 REPORT No. 53 (1979-80) TO THE PARLIAMENT CONCERNING THE ACTIVITY ON THE NOR-
WEGIAN CONTINENTAL SHELF. Each block is approximately 200 square miles.
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reserves of 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 7.4 Tcf of natural gas." By 1975,
oil production from the field reached 8.7 mtoes, thereby exceeding Nor-
way's own consumption of 7.4 mtoes.6 2 Norway became the only net
exporter of oil within the OECD area. Soon, in 1977, the field's gas came
on stream through a pipeline to Germany.
3. Frigg Field
At that same time, the Frigg natural gas field, with recoverable
reserves of approximately 7.4 Tcf, came on stream through a pipeline to
Scotland. The Frigg field had been discovered in 1971 in a block
awarded three years earlier. It is located some 220 miles north of Ekofisk
on the border between the British and Norwegian continental shelves.
Negotiations between the British and Norwegian governments resulted
in a division of the field that allocated 60.82% of the reserves to Nor-
way.63 Elf Aquitaine, the current operator, has developed the field as one
unit. With both the Ekofisk and Frigg fields in operation, combined oil
and gas production in 1980 climbed to approximately one million barrels
per day.M
4. Statfiord Field
By that time, production had also started at the Statfjord field dis-
covered five years earlier. Statfjord, with originally recoverable reserves
of 2.7 billion barrels of oil and 1.7 Tcf of natural gas,65 is the biggest field
in production in the North Sea. It also is located on the border between
the British and Norwegian sectors, and is only some ten miles north of
the Frigg field. The licensees, the Statfjord group, have agreed to a dis-
tribution of the reserves that assigns 84.1% to the Norwegian side.66
With Mobil Oil as operator, the Statfjord group is developing the field as
one unit, but in several phases. The field currently produces some
61 See generally OLJEDIREKTORATET, 1982 PERSPEKTIVANAYSEN 11 (NORWEGIAN OIL DI-
RECTORATE, PETROLEUM OUTLOOK (August 1982)).
62
Norwegian oil consumption 1975: 7.0 mtoe
Norwegian oil production 1975: 8.7 mtoe
These figures are not published and have been calculated by the author on information received from
the Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway. Mtoe = million tons of oil equivalents.
63 Agreement relating to the Exploitation of the Fregg Field Reservoir and the Transmission of
Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom, May 10, 1976, U.K.-Norway.
64 ROYAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY, 2 FACT SHEET 10 (1983).
65 OU-EDIREKTORATET, supra note 61, at 11.
66 Agreement Relating to the Exploitation of the Stattjord Field Reservoir and the Offtake of
Petroleum Therefrom, U.K.-Norway, Proposition No. 15 (1980-81) to the Parliament, adopted Dec.
19, 1980.
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300,000 barrels of oil per day.67
5. Current Importance of the Fields
Ekofisk, Frigg and Statfjord fields are Norway's three main produc-
ing areas. Two others, Murchison and Valhall/Hod also produce signifi-
cant amounts. Of Murchison's 350 million barrels of recoverable oil,
however, only 16.25% lie on the Norwegian side of a division with Brit-
ain.68 69 The Valhall/Hod fields have recoverable reserves estimated at
280 million barrels of oil and 1.2 of natural gas. These are the fields from
which Norway produces oil and gas today. They will continue to be the
most important for the rest of the decade.
It is interesting to note at this point that compared with offshore
field development elsewhere in the world, development in Norway has
proceeded rapidly and without unnecessary political or administrative
delays. All of the above-mentioned fields were developed as soon as the
operating companies declared them commercial. Naturally, concern for
both the socio-economic impact and the safety and environmental as-
pects has prompted warnings against overly-rapid development of Nor-
way's petroleum sector. But while such factors have been thoroughly
considered in the planning and regulation phases, and have strongly in-
fluenced final decisions, they have not delayed or limited exploration or
production.
D. Government Involvement Today
Today Norway produces nearly one million barrels per day, of
which close to one-half is oil.70 As a result, the petroleum sector, which
now accounts for nearly one-fifth of Norway's gross national product and
one-third of its total exports, has within a short period come to occupy a
dominant position in the Norwegian economy.7
Development of the continental shelf has involved investments of a
volume which seem out of proportion to the rest of the Norwegian econ-
omy. Thus far, some twelve billion dollars have been invested in explora-
67 O.JEDIREKTORATET, supra note 61, at 11.
68 Id.
69 ROYAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY, supra note 64, at 10.
70 Id. Conversion factor: 1 mbd = 48.2 ntoe per year.
71 See generally STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, supra note 18.
GNP 1982: 363 billion NOK
Value of oil and gas production in relation to GNP: 17%
Total exports 1982: 166 billion NOK
Oil and gas exports in relation to total exports: 35%
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics of Norway, supra note 22.
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tion, permanent installations and pipelines.72 And, we can expect yearly
investments in the magnitude of two to three billion dollars, or twenty-
five percent of Norway's total investments, in the next ten years.73 In
addition, operating costs will probably range between two and three bil-
lion dollars per year.74 Although most of those investments have in the
past been undertaken by foreign oil companies and financed from abroad,
the Norwegian share of investments is growing. This tendency is likely
to continue in the years ahead.
Such growth in Norwegian participation in the petroleum industry
resembles the trend in the hydropower industry. Thus it has been an
important state objective both to promote the use of Norwegian goods
and services for petroleum activities and to secure direct Norwegian par-
ticipation. The state encourages Norwegian deliveries on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis. Concession terms provide that "the licensee shall use
Norwegian goods and services in the activity as far as they are competi-
tive with regard to quality, service, schedule of delivery and price." 75
While they ensure that the Norwegian industry have the opportunity to
compete with established foreign suppliers, the terms do not constitute a
preferential clause.
Norwegian industries have gradually succeeded in building up their
ability to compete in the support market. In the beginning they made
only limited deliveries. By 1975, however, Norwegian industry's net
share of contracts for goods and services for use on the continental shelf
had reached twenty-eight percent. Today, a steady increase has led to a
nearly sixty percent share.76
The direct participation by Norwegian oil companies, is equally as
important as the delivery of goods and services to the operating compa-
nies. Currently there are three Norwegian oil companies that participate.
In 1972 Parliament decided by unanimous vote to establish a one hun-
dred percent state-owned oil company-"Den norske stats oljeselskap
A/S" or Statoil.77 At that time Norway's largest industrial company,
Norsk Hydro, was ready to enter the petroleum sector. Norsk Hydro
was established in 1905 for the industrial utilization of Norwegian hydro-
electricity and was originally controlled by private, foreign capital. In
72 ROYAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY, REPORT No. 40 TO THE STORTING, RE-




75 Royal Decree of Dec. 8, 1972, § 54.
76 See generally ROYAL MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY, supra note 72.
77 Proposition No. 113 (1971-72).
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1971, however, the Norwegian government acquired a majority of Norsk
Hydro's shares. In 1971 a group of large industrial companies estab-
lished a new oil company, Saga Petroleum, which is an entirely private
company.
E. Concessions and State Participation
In the first allocation of blocks on the Norwegian Continental Shelf
in 1965, the concession principle granted private companies the right to
explore, produce, transport and dispose of petroleum for a particularly
defined period of time. At that time, Norwegian equity share amounted
to only nine percent 7 8-the rest was granted to foreign companies.
Moreover, the state did not participate at all. It exercised its control and
secured its interests only through laws, regulations, taxes and royalties.
By 1969 and the second allocation, however, the Norwegian equity
share had increased to fifteen percent.79 More importantly, however, the
government changed the concession system by introducing participation
agreements. This made the state a direct party to agreements regulating
the development of each block. The state could then use those agree-
ments to secure the state's economic interests. It could establish either a
net profit agreement or an option agreement that would enable the state
to participate in case of commercial discoveries.
With the government's establishment of Statoil, it also effected an-
other major change, one that further increased state participation. With
this change, Statoil became a direct party to the agreements in place of
the state. And, the agreements then awarded at least fifty percent to
Statoil, an increase to fifty-one percent at the time of discovery, and a
share which could go up to eighty percent, depending on a sliding scale
keyed to the level of production.
It should be noted at this point that the special status of Statoil is
regulated not by law, but through the detailed rules of the participation
agreements. Description of the rules lies beyond the scope of this article.
And those rules may change soon. The government decided (some time
ago) to examine the organization of the state's participation in the petro-
leum sector and it appointed a special committee. Although the commit-
tee delivered its report in February of 19838° it is still too early to predict
what changes it may cause. Furthermore, the committee's mandate was
78 Report of Feb. 21, 1983, Relating to the organization of the state's participation in petroleum
activities, by a Committee appointed by Royal Decree of Mar. 5, 1982.
79 Id.
80 Id. The government also appointed a committee to examine the consequences of various levels
of activity on the continental shelf. This committee delivered its report on Apr. 20, 1983.
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limited to making recommendations to strengthen the parliamentary
control and management of petroleum activities. Neither the state's
rights nor income were to be reduced but public administration functions
were to be separated from commercial operations. The recommenda-
tions, therefore, might lead to organizational changes, which could in
turn have consequences for the role of Statoil.
F. THE FUTURE: Available Norwegian Resources
Although estimates of total hydrocarbon reserves remain uncertain,
there is no doubt that Norwegian oil and gas production can continue
well into the future. The potential areas may be identified as those either
north or south of the sixty-second parallel. South of the parallel, there
are some 2.7 billion toe of proven reserves." Of those reserves, oil ac-
counts for about 1.2 billion tons, or nine billion barrels (18), a figure
comparable to one-third of the proven recoverable oil reserves in the
United States.8" To date, only 250 million toe of those Norwegian
proven reserves have been produced.83 And, in addition to proven
reserves there are also another two billion toe that are "estimated recov-
erable resources."84 Those sources probably contain a high proportion of
natural gas.
There might also be significant reserves north of the sixty-second
parallel. Although there are still no official estimates and exploration has
yet to yield reliable estimates, the area is six times larger than the shelf
south of the parallel and has yielded several finds since exploratory drill-
ing began in 1980. Natural gas was discovered in 1981 in the very north
of Norway, west of Troms, at Tromsoflaket. In 1982, three new finds
were made in that same area. And later, in 1983, oil was found offshore
of mid-Norway at Haltenbanken.
The mere discovery of such reserves does not alone suffice, however.
Commercial development is often complicated by deep waters, complex
seabeds and long distances to markets. Thus, it is still too early to know
whether and under what transportation alternative these recently discov-
ered fields will prove to be commercially feasible. Even if gas production
at Tromsoflaket were ready to begin by the end of the 1990s, it is unlikely
that production would reach significant levels until after the turn of the
century.
It follows, therefore, that the reserves south of the sixty-second par-
81 See generally OLJEDIREKTORATET, Supra note 61.
82 See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 1.
83 See OLJEDIREKTORATET,supra note 61.
84 Id.
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allel will decide production levels until the year 2000. For those reserves,
however, experience shows that it takes three to ten years of exploration
to develop the information required for a decision to exploit a field. It
then takes yet another four to six years of investment before production
can start. We can therefore conclude that Norwegian oil and gas produc-
tion for the rest of the 1980's is more or less determined by the capacity
of fields already in production or under development. On this basis, it is
fairly safe to assume that oil production may increase from the current
500,000 barrels per day to a maximum of 700,000 barrels per day around
1990. For that same period, natural gas production will probably remain
stable at the equivalent of 500,000 barrels per day, or maybe increase
slightly.
Although total production will remain relatively stable, it will in-
volve substantial changes in production patterns. Ekofisk field produc-
tion, which has already peaked, will continue to decrease in the 1980s.
This is being offset, however, by increased production from other fields,
mainly from Statfjord. Production levels at the Frigg field are expected
to remain at a stable level of approximately 200,000 barrel equivalents
per day throughout the decade. To summarize, therefore, combined oil
and gas production from the fields now in production or under develop-
ment may increase to about 1.2 million barrels per day by 1990. From
then on, however, production from these particular fields will decrease to
a probable level of 300,000 barrels per day.
Decreased production from the older fields will be offset, however,
by production in other fields. Several new fields are now being evaluated
for production. Four bigger ones-Oseberg, Sleipner, Gullfaks and
Troll-will be decisive. Oseberg is a combined oil and gas field west of
Bergen. Since the license was granted in 1979, reserves have been esti-
mated at 0.7 billion barrels of oil and at 2.1 Tcf of gas.85 This field could
come on stream by 1991. Sleipner, a gas field between Frigg and Ekofisk,
has estimated reserves of 7.1 Tcf.86 This field also could come on stream
in the early 1990s. Its licensees are currently negotiating with European
gas buyers. The outcome of the negotiations will be decisive for the
field's future development.
Gullfaks, located east of Statfjord, is primarily an oil field. Its
reserves are estimated at 1.4 billion barrels of oil and at 0.8 Tcf of gas.8 7
Because the first phase of development is already underway, production
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velopment of an additional 0.7 billion barrels of oil, could possibly lead
to production start-up in the mid-1990s.
The fourth field, Troll, which was discovered east of Bergen in 1979,
is a giant. Although it is primarily a gas field, it also contains substantial
quantities of oil. Its total recoverable reserves have been estimated at
fifty-six Tcf of gas and at one billion barrels of oil.88 This probably
makes Troll the biggest known offshore field in the world. The problem,
however, is that Troll is also one of the most complicated fields. Located
in the middle of the so-called Norwegian Trench, its waters 300 to 350
meters deep are twice as deep as those above any other field thus far
developed in the North Sea. Moreover, the field's geology is compli-
cated. The communication among its variety of geological structures is
still somewhat unclear, and the combination of oil and gas in thin layers
may cause production problems. Despite its technological and economic
challenges, however, the Troll field could be this century's most impor-
tant offshore undertaking in either Norway or in all of Western Europe.
It is the gas from this field that may help Europe to diversify its gas
supplies in the late 1990s.
Thus, based on the proven or reasonably assured reserves of the
fields described above, Norway can expect to maintain both oil and gas
production in the 1900's-and perhaps increase production to 1.6 mbd
toward the year 2000.89 Whether this may be realized, however, will
depend particularly upon technological, financial and political factors.
III. CONCLUSION
Industrialization and economic growth in Norway are probably
more closely linked to the development of indigenous energy resources
than in any other western country. The hydropower and hydrocarbon
sectors clearly differ. Nevertheless, Norway's main objectives and her
basic principles for developing her resources are similar. Comprehensive
special legislation now secures national control of energy resources. By
taking into account basic social and economic policies, the government
aims to insure that these resources provide maximum benefit to society as
a whole.
Both Norway's energy resource development policy and related in-
dustrial policy rely on international cooperation, paying particular atten-
tion to international law, economic and monetary policies, and to trade.
Moreover, internal energy consumption policy, including pricing and
88 Id.
89 See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES OF IEA
COUNTRIES 1981 REVIEW.
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conservation, has taken the international energy situation into account
by developing in line with principles established by the International En-
ergy Agency.
Within this framework the creation of domestic industrial and man-
agement capacity to develop and utilize indigenous energy resources has
become a primary goal. In light of Norway's experience thus far, it is fair
to assume that these basic objectives and principles will predominate in
her future energy policy. As a result, the development of indigenous en-
ergy resources will continue to play a decisive role in industrial and eco-
nomic growth. And Norway can then be expected to maintain, or even
increase, its exports or energy and of energy-based products to Western
Europe and to the United States.
